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Over past decade, the Iowa gambling task (IGT) has been utilized to test various decision
deficits induced by neurological damage or psychiatric disorders.The IGT has recently been
standardized for identifying 13 different neuropsychological disorders. Neuropsychological
patients choose bad decks frequently, and normal subjects prefer good expected value (EV)
decks. However, the IGT has several validity and reliability problems. Some research groups
have pointed out that the validity of IGT is influenced by the personality and emotional state
of subjects. Additionally, several other studies have proposed that the “prominent deck B
phenomenon” (PDB phenomenon) – that is, normal subjects preferring bad deck B – may
be the most serious problem confronting IGT validity. Specifically, deck B offers a high
frequency of gains but negative EV. In the standard IGT administration, choice behavior
can be understood with reference to gain-loss frequency (GLF) rather than inferred future
consequences (EV, the basic assumption of IGT). Furthermore, using two different crite-
ria (basic assumption vs. professional norm) results in significantly different classification
results.Therefore, we recruited 72 normal subjects to test the validity and reliability of IGT.
Each subject performed three runs of the computer-based clinical IGT version. The PDB
phenomenon has been observed to a significant degree in the first and second stages of
the clinical IGT version. Obviously, validity, reliability, and the practice effect were unsta-
ble between two given stages. The present form of the clinical IGT version has only one
stage, so its use should be reconsidered for examining normal decision makers; results
from patient groups must also be interpreted with great care. GLF could be the main factor
to be considered in establishing the constructional validity and reliability of the clinical IGT
version.
Keywords: Iowa gambling task, clinical Iowa gambling task version, prominent deck B phenomenon, gain-loss
frequency, expected value, validity, reliability
INTRODUCTION
Designed in 1994, the Iowa gambling task (IGT) has become
one of the most complicated tasks used to study executive func-
tions and emotionally driven decision making under uncertainty
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). Original studies have
shown that patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)
lesions (Damasio et al., 1991; Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000) and emotion system deficits (Bechara, 2001, 2003, 2004;
Bechara and Damasio, 2002, 2005; Bechara et al., 2002) perform
less well in IGT than do normal decision makers (Damasio, 1994).
The IGT was originally designed to test decision-making ability
and frontal cortex functioning in highly ambiguous circumstances,
with the goal of simulating real-life choice behavior (Eslinger and
Damasio, 1985; Damasio et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994). Subjects are
asked to play the IGT where they must intuitively determine the
internal rules of the game. They are told that the game may end
at any moment and that they must win as much as possible or
lose as little as possible. Hence, subjects initially have no idea of
the game’s internal structure. In all IGT versions (Tables 1 and 2),
four decks are used and the endpoint is the 100th trial. Decks A
and B are disadvantageous decks, with 10 cards in each deck hav-
ing a negative expected value (EV). Conversely, decks C and D are
advantageous decks, with 10 cards in each deck having a positive
expected return. The basic assumption is that subjects significantly
preferring the bad decks over the good ones are myopic decision
makers who are insensitive to the bad long-term outcome offered
by these decks (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000).
Over the last few years, various IGT versions have been gener-
ated (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000; Bechara, 2007). Most versions have
confirmed the validity of the basic assumption that the emotional
system of normal decision makers enables them to foresee the
long-term benefits (EV) of particular choices. The Iowa group has
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Table 1 |The gain-loss structure of original version in Iowa gambling
task (Bechara et al., 1994).
IGT A B C D
1 100 100 50 50
2 100 100 50 50
3 100, −150 100 50, −50 50
4 100 100 50 50
5 100, −300 100 50, −50 50
6 100 100 50 50
7 100, −200 100 50, −50 50
8 100 100 50 50
9 100, −250 100, −1250 50, −50 50
10 100, −350 100 50, −50 50, −250
11 100 100 50 50
12 100, −350 100 50, −25 50
13 100 100 50, −75 50
14 100, −250 100, −1250 50 50
15 100, −200 100 50, −25 50
16 100 100 50 50
17 100, −300 100 50, −25 50
18 100, −150 100 50, −75 50
19 100 100 50 50
20 100 100 50, −50 50, −250
21 100 100, −1250 50 50
22 100, −300 100 50 50
23 100 100 50 50
24 100, −350 100 50, −50 50
25 100 100 50, −25 50
26 100, −200 100 50, −50 50
27 100, −250 100 50 50
28 100, −150 100 50 50
29 100 100 50, −75 50, −250
30 100 100 50, −50 50
31 100, −350 100 50 50
32 100, −200 100, −1250 50 50
33 100, −250 100 50 50
34 100 100 50, −25 50
35 100 100 50, −25 50, −250
36 100 100 50 50
37 100, −150 100 50, −75 50
38 100, −300 100 50 50
39 100 100 50, −50 50
40 100 100 50, −75 50
Net value
(in 40 trials)
−1000 −1000 1000 1000
GLF (in average
10 trials)
10 gains 10 gains 10 gains 10 gains
5 losses 1 loss 5 losses 1 loss
The red and blue represented the loss and gain respectively.
published a clinical IGT version for use in quantitative assessment,
and this version’s evaluative validity has been claimed for 13 neu-
rological and psychiatric disorders, including focal brain lesions,
intact older adults, substance addiction, pathological gambling,
schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, anorexia nervosa,
obesity, chronic pain, ADHD, aggression disorders, affective
disorders, and Huntington’s disease (Bechara, 2007).
The original IGT has been modified to develop a new computer-
based clinical IGT version and further confirm the decision dys-
function of VMPFC patients (Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara, 2007).
This clinical IGT version (Table 2) is different from the original
version (Bechara et al., 1994) in many ways:
1. In the clinical IGT version, various rewards are given in each
trial. In the original IGT version, the reward in each trial for
decks A and B is $100, whereas the reward in each trial for decks
A and B in the clinical IGT version is $100 on average. Similar
adjustments are true for decks C and D.
2. The average immediate reward for decks A and B in each set of
10 trials is increased by $10 in the clinical IGT version and that
for decks C and D is increased by $5.
3. For decks A and C in the clinical IGT version, the number of
punishments is gradually increased in each set of 10 trials and
the value of each punishment is kept at the same magnitude.
Conversely, for decks B and D, the number of punishments is
kept the same in each set of 10 trials and the value of each pun-
ishment is gradually increased. For instance, deck A (C) in the
first set of 10 trials has “five” punishments, and the value ranges
from $150 to $350 ($25 to $75). The second set of 10 trials has
“six” punishments, and the value also ranges from $150 to $350
($25 to $75). In contrast, deck B (D) in the first set of 10 trials
has only one punishment with a value of $1250 ($250). The
second set of 10 trials also has only one punishment with a
value of $1500 ($275).
4. For an average of 10 trials (one set), decks A and B in the
clinical IGT version have negative EV, and such negative EV is
increased by $150 in each set (10 trials). Conversely, decks C
and D have positive EV for an average of 10 trials (one set), and
such positive EV is increased by $25 in each set (10 trials).
The foregoing modifications enhance EV contrast between the
advantageous and disadvantageous decks; bad decks A and B
become worse and good decks C and D become better in the long
run (Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara, 2007). Bechara et al. (2000)
demonstrated that the results of the original and clinical IGT ver-
sions for normal and VMPFC groups do not differ significantly.
Moreover, they combined the computer-based and inverted IGT
versions to illustrate that the dysfunction associated with VMPFC
is insensitivity to future consequence (for a detailed description,
see Bechara et al., 2000).
Based on the computer-based clinical IGT version, Bechara
(2007) published a professional manual for clinical assessment.
However, prior to the publication of the IGT manual, few studies
had already examined the new version’s constructional validity.
To examine the constructional validity of IGT, Buelow and Suhr
(2009) reviewed numerous studies related to executive functions,
decision making, and IGT, including studies on brain damage,
functional imaging, children and adolescents, adults, drug abusers,
pathological gamblers, OCD, and schizophrenia. They also dis-
cussed three issues that may influence the constructional validity
of IGT: (1) the kind of decision abilities measured by IGT; (2)
the absence of evidence of IGT reliability; and (3) the impact of
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Table 2 |The gain-loss structure of clinical version in Iowa gambling
task (Bechara, 2007).
IGT A B C D
Gain in each trial 80∼170 80∼170 40∼95 40∼95
1
2
3 −150 −50
4
5 −300 −50
6
7 −200 −50
8
9 −250 −1250 −50
10 −350 −50 −250
11
12 −350 −25
13 −75
14 −250 −1500
15 −200 −25
16
17 −300 −25
18 −150 −75
19 −250
20 −50 −275
21 −250 −1750
22 −300 −25
23
24 −350 −50
25 −25
26 −200 −50
27 −250
28 −150 −25
29 −250 −75 −300
30 −50
31 −350 −25
32 −200 −2000
33 −250 −25
34 −250 −25
35 −150 −25 −325
36
37 −150 −75
38 −300 −25
39 −350 −50
40 −75
41 −350 −25
42 −200
43 −250 −25
44 −250 −25
45 −150 −25 −350
46 −2250 −25
47 −150 −75
48 −300 −25
49 −350 −50
(Continued)
IGT A B C D
Gain in each trial 80∼170 80∼170 40∼95 40∼95
50 −250 −75
51 −350 −25
52 −200 −25
53 −250 −25
54 −250 −25
55 −150 −25
56 −250 −25
57 −150 −75
58 −300 −2500 −25 −375
59 −350 −50
60 −250 −75
EV (in 60 trials) −3750 −3750 1875 1875
GLF (in average
10 trials)
10 gains 10 gains 10 gains 10 gains
5∼10
losses
1 loss 5∼10
losses
1 loss
personality traits and emotional state on IGT performance. They
demonstrated that a small part of normal control groups perform
worse in IGT and interpreted this finding based on two factors,
namely, personality and emotional state. Suhr and Tsanadis (2007)
suggested that bad IGT performance is related to high scores of
reward responsiveness, fun seeking, and negative emotional states.
However, they provided inconsistent evidence in their subsequent
study (Hammers and Suhr, 2010). Furthermore, Horstmann et al.
(2012) have also demonstrated that there exist various decision
patterns in a healthy subject group. In short, reliability and validity
are still critical problems in the clinical IGT version.
Over the past decade, an increasing number of investigations
have pointed out a serious design flaw and a confounding factor
in the IGT. Gain-loss frequency (GLF), rather than EV, can pre-
dict the choice behavior of the control group of normal decision
makers (Wilder et al., 1998; Fernie and Tunney, 2006; Chiu and
Lin, 2007; Fernie, 2007; Lin et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; Chiu et al.,
2008; Fum et al., 2008; Stocco and Fum, 2008; Stocco et al., 2009;
Napoli and Fum, 2010). This “prominent deck B phenomenon”
(PDB phenomenon) refers to the finding that normal subjects
prefer bad deck B, which offers high-frequency gain but has a
negative EV (Lin et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2012). Researchers have
suggested that under uncertainty, even normal decision makers are
most influenced by GLF; they are driven by immediate prospects
rather than by long-term benefits. Foresighted decision making
is very difficult in highly ambiguous situations. This viewpoint
of immediate gain-loss is consistent with the behavioral decision
literature, which describes the prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003).
Growing research on clinical populations and behavioral mod-
eling has revealed that GLF is the primary variable affecting the
choices not only of control groups (Ahn et al., 2008; Horstmann
et al., 2012), but also of patient groups (O’Carroll and Papps,
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2003; Ritter et al., 2004; Toplak et al., 2005, 2010; Dunn et al.,
2006; Martino et al., 2007; van Holst et al., 2010; Upton et al.,
2012).
The Iowa research group has identified the PDB phenomenon
in clinical studies (Sevy et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2008). Notably,
the description for deck B in Bechara’s (2007) professional manual
is different from the basic IGT assumption (Bechara et al., 1994).
Descriptions for the decks in the manual are as follows:
Deck A’. Deck A’ is almost universally avoided by neurologi-
cally intact individuals. A high number of cards selected from
this deck is strongly indicative of the presence of decision-
making impairments in the examinee . . . Deck B’. A low
number of cards selected from Deck B’ is strongly indica-
tive of good or advantageous decision-making capacity on
the part of the examinee. However, a high number of cards
selected from this deck is less conclusive because the total
number of selections from this deck in neurologically intact
individuals can approach that of neurologically impaired
patients. . .. . . (Bechara, 2007, p. 9)
Obviously, these are critical statements differentiating bad deck A
from bad deck B. In addition, some dissimilarity can be observed
between good deck C and good deck D. The number of cards
selected from bad deck B needed to conclude a bad decision is
obviously higher than the needed number of cards selected from
bad deck A. This makes the judgment score in the clinical IGT
version, that is [(C+D)−(A+B)], relatively looser than the judg-
ment score in the original IGT, which is [(C+D)−(A+B)= 40]
(see also Chiu et al., 2012). Therefore, we hypothesized that the
categorization using the clinical IGT and original IGT versions
would significantly differ.
On one hand, to validate inconsistencies between findings from
the use of the professional norm published by Bechara (2007) and
the basic assumption by Bechara et al. (1994), the present study
employed the clinical IGT version as a research tool. The clinical
IGT version was repeated three times (stages) with normal subjects
to observe the extended validity, reliability, and the practice effect.
On the other hand, although some studies have suggested that
factors, such as personality, negative affect (Buelow and Suhr, 2009;
Hammers and Suhr, 2010), and executive functions (Gansler et al.,
2011a,b), may considerably affect the performance of subjects and
influence IGT validity, we nevertheless considered that the PDB
phenomenon may provide alternative causality for the IGT validity
problem.
Furthermore, we adopted not only traditional IGT analysis
methods (four decks and five-block learning curves), but also fol-
lowed some parts of the research method adopted by Hammers
and Suhr (2010). We used the professional norm (criteria) in the
published manual (Bechara, 2007) and also criteria based on basic
assumption (Bechara et al., 1994) to categorize the performance
of normal subjects and label good and bad decision makers. In
short, we hypothesized that the critical problem of IGT validity
lies in the PDB phenomenon, that is, most normal subjects – not
just a few – would prefer the frequent gains offered by bad deck
B. Specifically, we proposed that GLF may be the most critical fac-
tor in establishing the constructional validity and reliability of the
clinical IGT version.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In the experiment, 72 subjects completed the clinical IGT version.
The number of males (35) and females (37) was kept almost equal
to eliminate the effects of gender-based differences. All subjects
were recruited from the campus of Soochow University. Data were
analyzed at the group level and reported anonymously.
TASK
The gain-loss structure of the clinical IGT version published by
Bechara (2007) was used in this study (Table 2; see also Takano
et al., 2010). Instructions for the IGT were provided to each sub-
ject. All subjects played a three-stage clinical IGT version (100 trials
per stage) to determine their extended preference. At the start of
Stages 2 and 3, subjects were informed that the internal rules of
the game were the same as those in the preceding stage. The deck
position was identical on the computer screen across three stages.
PROCEDURE
Subjects played the clinical IGT version thrice. At the start of the
game, they were given the original introduction to IGT (Bechara
et al., 1999, 2000; Bechara, 2007). Care was taken to ensure that all
subjects understood how the game would be played on the com-
puter. After Stages 1 and 2, participants were asked to play the game
once more, and they were emphatically informed that the internal
rules of the game in Stage 2 (Stage 3) were the same as those in
Stage 1 (Stage 2). There have only a few minutes break between
each two stages for subjects. The break allowed experimenters to
reload the computer program and provide a short introduction
for following stages.
DATA ANALYSIS
Four deck, net score, and learning curve analysis
The average number of cards selected, the net score
[(C+D)−(A+B)] for five blocks (each block includes 20 trials),
and the learning curve (depicted with five blocks) for each deck
were used to describe findings between decks and infer the weights
of factors (EV vs. GLF). In the general linear model, repeated mea-
surements were made to evaluate the effect of two factors, namely,
EV [(C+D) vs. (A+B)] and GLF [(A+C) vs. (B+D)]. In addi-
tion, one-way ANOVA and post hoc analysis were carried out to
determine differences among decks (A, B, C, and D) and assess
the effect of learning on the subjects. The exact difference between
two decks in each stage was evaluated by paired sample t -test.
Reliability and practice effect test: comparison between two stages
Multivariate test was conducted to examine test-retest reliability
and the practice effect between two stages. Post hoc analysis was
employed for each deck to observe at which stage the learning
effect becomes significant.
Comparison between the basic IGT assumption and professional
norm
The present study utilized the basic assumption of Bechara et al.
(1994) and the published professional norm (Bechara, 2007) to
classify bad and good decision makers. The number of good and
bad decision makers was statistically tested (χ2) in each criterion
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(assumption) (Bechara et al., 1994 vs. Bechara, 2007). If the Iowa
group is right, results of the two categorization methods should
be nearly equal. The detailed criteria for both assumptions are as
follows.
Criteria based on the basic assumption. According to Bechara
et al. (1994), normal decision makers choose the good decks.
Therefore, in the standard IGT administration (100 trials), the cri-
terion of chance-level selection should be 25 cards on each deck.
Bad choice pattern is defined as over-selecting 25 cards on bad
decks A and B or under-selecting 25 cards on good decks C and D.
Criteria based on the professional norm. According to the norm
in the IGT manual published by Bechara (2007, p. 38), college stu-
dents in the present study must be screened with the professional
norm as follows: age= 18–39 years and education= 13–15 years.
Bad choice pattern is defined as over-selecting 22 cards on bad
deck A, over-selecting 38 cards on bad deck B, under-selecting
13 cards on good deck C, or under-selecting 20 cards on good
deck D.
We classified normal subjects into four types based on their
choice patterns in relation to bad decks (L_A/L_B= low deck
A and low deck B; L_A/H_B= low deck A and high deck B;
H_A/L_B= high deck A and low deck B; and H_A/H_B= high
deck A and high deck B). In addition, we classified normal
subjects into four types based on their choice patterns in rela-
tion to the good decks (L_C/L_D= low deck C and low deck
D; L_C/H_D= low deck C and high deck D; H_C/L_D= high
deck C and low deck D; and H_C/H_D= high deck C and high
deck D).
RESULTS
FOUR DECKS ANALYSIS
The general linear model revealed that GLF (decks B and D vs.
decks A and C) – rather than EV (decks C and D vs. decks A
and B) – dominated the choice behavior of subjects in Stage 1.
The number of trials was the same as in the standard adminis-
tration of the clinical IGT version. However, in Stage 2, the two
factors, EV and GLF, equally influenced choice behavior. In Stage
3, EV overrode GLF in influencing choice behavior (Figure 1).
Table 3 presents detailed statistics and the effects of the inter-
action between the two factors. Regression analysis (R-square)
verified the above observation across the three stages (see η2 in
Table 3).
One-way ANOVA and post hoc analysis were employed to com-
pare the average number of cards selected in each stage between
each pair of decks (A vs. B vs. C vs. D). Significant differences
between the decks were evident in all three stages [Stage 1: F(3,
284)= 22.78, p< 0.01; Stage 2: F(3, 284)= 26.70, p< 0.01; Stage
3: F(3, 284)= 29.31, p< 0.01]. Post hoc analysis indicated that,
in each stage, significant differences existed between each pair of
decks under most conditions (Table 4), but differences between
decks B and D in Stage 1, between decks B and C in Stage 2, and
between decks C and D in Stage 3 were not significant. Table 4
presents detailed statistics obtained from the post hoc analysis.
Notably, bad deck B was significantly preferred to bad deck A in
all three stages.
FIGURE 1 | Average number of cards chosen in each stage. The average
number of cards selected in the three stages demonstrates that the subject
significantly prefers bad deck B to bad deck A in all three stages. Notably,
normal decision makers significantly favor good decks C and D in Stage 3.
NET SCORE AND LEARNING CURVES ANALYSIS
The basic program of the clinical IGT version automatically gen-
erates a net score by subtracting the value of the bad deck from
that of the good deck [(C+D)−(A+B)] for each block (20 tri-
als/block). In each stage, these scores were plotted to generate a
curve describing the performance of each subject. Thus, in the
general linear model, repeated measurements of five blocks (Block
1–5) revealed that the subjects gradually learned to prefer the high
EV choice (Figure 2) [Stage 1: F(4, 284)= 5.57, p< 0.01; Stage 2:
F(4, 284)= 11.79, p< 0.01; Stage 3: F(4, 284)= 9.714, p< 0.01].
However, the details of the learning curve associated with each
deck in each stage revealed that deck B was strongly preferred not
only in Stage 1 but also in Stage 2 (Figures 3–5). A detailed paired
t -test between each pair of decks in each block was conducted, and
the subjects were found to prefer bad deck B to bad deck A. Notably,
in Stage 1, bad deck B was chosen significantly more often than
good deck C in each block (Figure 3). Even in Stage 2, bad deck
B was nearly equal to that for good deck C (Figure 4) in the last
four blocks. Table 5 presents detailed statistics for comparison. In
summary, the curves demonstrate that the subjects preferred good
decks C and D in most stages, but tended not to avoid bad deck
B even in Stage 2. The PDB phenomenon was thus verified in the
clinical IGT version.
RELIABILITY AND PRACTICE EFFECT TEST: COMPARISON BETWEEN
TWO STAGES
Significant differences were found among stages for all decks [deck
A: F(2)= 10.13, p< 0.01; deck B: F(2)= 7.89, p< 0.01; deck C:
F(2)= 7.29,p< 0.01; deck D: F(2)= 3.11,p< 0.05]. The learning
effect by stages can be observed for bad decks A and B between
Stages 1 and 2 and Stages 1 and 3, and for good decks C between
Stages 1 and 3, and Stages 2 and 3, and D only between Stage 1 and
3 (Table 6).
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BASIC ASSUMPTION AND
PROFESSIONAL NORM
Significant differences were found when good and bad decision
makers were classified based on the basic assumption and the
professional norm (Figures 6 and 7).
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Table 3 |The statistics of general linear model across three stages.
Stage Effect F Hypothesis df Error df p-Value Partial η2
1 EV 0.36 1 71 0.55 0.01
GLF 45.17 1 71 0.00** 0.39
EV×GLF 7.66 1 71 0.00** 0.10
2 EV 28.30 1 71 0.00** 0.29
GLF 28.44 1 71 0.00** 0.29
EV×GLF 2.73 1 71 0.10 0.04
3 EV 42.18 1 71 0.00** 0.37
GLF 9.85 1 71 0.00** 0.12
EV×GLF 3.06 1 71 0.09 0.04
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Table 4 |The statistics of post hoc analysis across three stages.
Bonferroni correction Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Paired deck Mean differences p-Value Mean differences p-Value Mean differences p-Value
A–B −11.83 0.00** −10.93 0.00** −8.67 0.00**
A–C −4.29 0.04* −11.31 0.00** −17.38 0.00**
A–D −9.10 0.00** −17.04 0.00** −19.85 0.00**
B–C 7.54 0.00** −0.38 1.00 −8.71 0.00**
B–D 2.74 0.47 −6.11 0.01* −11.18 0.00**
C–D −4.81 0.01* −5.74 0.02* −2.47 1.00
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.
FIGURE 2 | Average number of cards in each block in each stage. In the
standard net score [(C+D)−(A+B)] in the clinical IGT version, the
tendency to learn good EV is significant in each stage. The slopes of the
learning curves increase rapidly in Stages 2 and 3. However, the standard
clinical IGT version involves only 100 trials. The presentation of net scores
has raised the question of whether normal decision makers truly avoid all of
the bad EV cards and favor all of the good EV cards, and the question of
why the difference between Block 1 and Block 5 in Stage 1 is only four
cards [2−(−2)].
As shown in Figure 6, the significant difference in the num-
ber of good and bad decision makers classified based on the basic
assumption and the professional norm was primarily found in the
FIGURE 3 | Average number of cards selected in blocks in Stage 1. The
learning curves show that decks B and D (with high-frequency gain) are
preferred to decks A and C (with low-frequency gain), even though bad deck
B has a negative EV and good deck C has a positive EV. This observation
verifies the PDB phenomenon and the theory that GLF dominates the
choice behavior of decision makers.
L_A/H_B (low deck A and high deck B) group [χ2(2)= 29.25,
p< 0.01] and L_A/L_B (low deck A and low deck B) group
[χ2(2)= 41.33, p< 0.01]. In the L_A/H_B group, only nine sub-
jects matched the criteria in the professional norm, whereas 45
subjects fitted the criteria in the basic assumption. Meanwhile, in
the L_A/L_B group, 48 subjects matched the criteria in the pro-
fessional norm, whereas only 20 subjects fitted the criteria in the
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FIGURE 4 | Average number of cards selected in blocks in Stage 2. In
Stage 2, normal decision makers strongly prefer deck D (with
high-frequency gain and positive EV). Bad deck B and good deck C are
favored almost equally throughout most of the five blocks, and deck A with
low-frequency gain and negative EV is consistently avoided.
FIGURE 5 | Average number of cards selected in blocks in Stage 3. In
Stage 3, bad deck B is no longer preferred nearly as much as good deck C.
The learning curves for the good and bad decks significantly diverge in
Stage 3. Normal decision makers slowly come to favor decks C and D with
positive EV and avoid decks A and B with negative EV.
basic assumption. No significant differences were found between
the two criteria in terms of the choice patterns of subjects in the
H_A/L_B group (high deck A and low deck B) and H_A/H_B
group (high deck A and high deck B).
As shown in Figure 7, the significant difference in the num-
ber of subjects with good choice patterns classified based on
the basic assumption and the professional norm was primarily
found in the L_C/H_D (low deck C and high deck D) group
[χ2(2)= 23.08, p< 0.01] and H_C/H_D (high deck C and high
deck D) group [χ2(2)= 55.08, p< 0.01]. In the L_C/H_D group,
only five subjects matched the criteria in the professional norm,
whereas 31 subjects fitted the criteria in the basic assumption.
In the H_C/H_D group, 53 subjects matched the criteria in the
professional norm, whereas only 15 subjects fitted the criteria in
the basic assumption. No significant differences were observed
between classifications based on the basic assumption and the pro-
fessional norm in terms of choice patterns in the L_C/L_D group
(low deck C and low deck D) and H_C/L_D group (high deck C
and low deck D).
DISCUSSION
In this study, the subjects focused on GLF in Stage 1 (Figures 1 and
2). They were more influenced by EV after Stage 2 (Figures 3–5),
and the PDB phenomenon occurred not only in Stage 1 but also
in Stage 2. This finding seriously affects the validity of the clinical
IGT version in elucidating the decision behavior of neurologically
impaired and psychiatric patients. Notably, even normal decision
makers are more sensitive to GLF than to EV in the standard IGT
(100 trials). Additionally, the degree of uncertainty experienced
(more types of gain-loss value) by subjects regarding their deci-
sions in the clinical IGT version (Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara,
2007) exceeds that in previous IGT version (Bechara et al., 1994).
The findings of this study in relation to the clinical IGT version
are not isolated. Fernie and Tunney (2006) made similar findings
in a two-stage IGT. They found that the number of people pre-
ferring deck B exceeds the number of those preferring the three
other decks in Stage 1. Furthermore, some clinical investigations
have noted no deficits in clinical groups (Wilder et al., 1998; Nielen
et al., 2002).
A few studies have demonstrated the effect of GLF on
decision making not only on control groups (Lin et al., 2007; Chiu
et al., 2012), but also on clinical and experimental groups (Wilder
et al., 1998; O’Carroll and Papps, 2003; Crone et al., 2004; Overman
et al., 2004; Ritter et al., 2004; Bark et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Sanchez
et al., 2005; Toplak et al., 2005; Caroselli et al., 2006; Fernie and
Tunney, 2006; Martino et al., 2007; Fum et al., 2008; Fridberg
et al., 2010). A review by Steingroever et al. (2013) involving eight
datasets on control groups in clinical studies confirmed the PDB
phenomenon and concluded that the use of IGT based on the
basic assumption (EV) for testing the decision behavior of healthy
subjects demands careful reconsideration.
Recently, Upton et al. (2012) utilized the IGT and SGT (Soo-
chow Gambling Task, a modified version of IGT; Chiu et al., 2008)
to compare the decision-making performance of normal subjects
with that of opiate users. Results revealed that both groups were
more sensitive to GLF than EV in both tasks. In addition, the
opiate users performed worse than the normal controls in the
IGT because of their inability to use GLF as a decision-making
guide under uncertainty. This finding by Upton et al. (2012) is
inconsistent with a previous finding by Bechara et al. (2002) con-
cerning drug users. However, most of the Iowa group’s clinical
studies (Bechara et al., 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002; Bechara
and Damasio, 2002) presented their results in a net-score for-
mat [(C+D)−(A+B)], and this manner of presentation makes
the detailed evaluation of both the PDB phenomenon and the
number of selected cards from each deck invisible.
An increasing number of clinical researchers have noticed the
PDB phenomenon, leading them to investigate the possibility of
employing GLF in distinguishing clinical from control groups
(Toplak et al., 2010; van Holst et al., 2010). Laboratories in Indiana
University (Ahn et al., 2008) and Max-Plank Institute (Horstmann
et al., 2012) have provided behavioral and modeling data related
to IGT and have suggested that under uncertainty, the GLF is more
important than EV.
Some pieces of evidence suggest that in Stage 3, subjects slowly
start avoiding bad deck B and begin favoring good decks C and D.
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Table 5 |The statistics of pair-T tests between each two decks in each block.
Paired deck Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
T (df=71) p-Value T (df=71) p-Value T (df=71) p-Value
A1–B1 −5.14 0.00** −5.33 0.00** −4.43 0.00**
A2–B2 −4.69 0.00** −4.28 0.00** −3.40 0.00**
A3–B3 −3.86 0.00** −4.16 0.00** −3.61 0.00**
A4–B4 −5.44 0.00** −4.35 0.00** −3.26 0.00**
A5–B5 −4.98 0.00** −4.52 0.00** −3.92 0.00**
A1–C1 −1.08 0.28 −1.40 0.17 −3.34 0.00**
A2–C2 −0.34 0.73 −4.38 0.00** −4.97 0.00**
A3–C3 −2.65 0.01* −4.55 0.00** −4.94 0.00**
A4–C4 −3.55 0.00** −4.78 0.00** −6.47 0.00**
A5–C5 −3.34 0.00** −5.55 0.00** −6.96 0.00**
A1–D1 −0.77 0.45 −1.79 0.08 −2.79 0.01*
A2–D2 −2.99 0.00** −5.33 0.00** −5.89 0.00**
A3–D3 −4.24 0.00** −6.27 0.00** −5.88 0.00**
A4–D4 −4.85 0.00** −6.67 0.00** −7.20 0.00**
A5–D5 −5.18 0.00** −5.65 0.00** −6.13 0.00**
B1–C1 4.26 0.00** 3.68 0.00** 0.10 0.92
B2–C2 4.45 0.00** −0.75 0.45 −2.72 0.01*
B3–C3 1.87 0.07 −0.90 0.37 −1.98 0.05
B4–C4 1.78 0.08 −0.74 0.46 −3.25 0.00**
B5–C5 2.36 0.02* −0.93 0.35 −2.51 0.02*
B1–D1 3.66 0.00** 2.54 0.01* 0.26 0.80
B2–D2 0.97 0.34 −2.24 0.03* −3.92 0.00**
B3–D3 −0.63 0.53 −2.74 0.01* −3.32 0.00**
B4–D4 0.82 0.42 −2.84 0.01* −3.64 0.00**
B5–D5 −0.27 0.79 −1.76 0.08 −1.85 0.07
C1–D1 0.08 0.94 −0.53 0.60 0.18 0.86
C2–D2 −2.67 0.01* −1.59 0.12 −1.47 0.15
C3–D3 −2.37 0.02* −1.72 0.09 −1.28 0.20
C4–D4 −1.09 0.28 −1.93 0.06 −0.42 0.68
C5-D5 −2.27 0.03* −0.96 0.34 0.69 0.49
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Table 6 |The post hoc analysis for each deck between each two stages.
Deck Stage LSD
correction
Mean
difference
Hypothesis
df
Error
df
P -value
A 1–2 3.51 1 71 0.00**
1–3 5.17 1 71 0.00**
2–3 1.65 1 71 0.16
B 1–2 4.42 1 71 0.04*
1–3 8.33 1 71 0.00**
2–3 3.92 1 71 0.06
C 1–2 −3.50 1 71 0.09
1–3 −7.92 1 71 0.00**
2–3 −4.42 1 71 0.04*
D 1–2 −4.43 1 71 0.06
1–3 −5.58 1 71 0.02*
2–3 −1.15 1 71 0.63
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.
This result implies that GLF and EV dominate the choice behavior
of subjects in different stages. In the initial stage (Stage 1), sub-
jects adopt the gain-stay lose-shift strategy (Mitropoulos, 2003;
Lin et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2008; Cassotti et al., 2011) to over-
come uncertainty. For instance, Chiu et al. (2008) demonstrated
that subjects tend to remain on the decks while receiving the gains
and shift their choice while they were receiving losses. On the
other hand, they gradually lose their preference for immediate
gain and fear of immediate loss in a stage with relative certainty
(Stage 2 or 3). Hence, decision makers may use different strategies
in short-run and long-run games. Normal subjects can learn to
make the right decisions for long-term benefits if they can play
the game with relative certainty regarding outcomes in the final
stages. Briefly, in the clinical IGT version, GLF first, and later EV,
can affect the decision patterns of normal subjects given more than
100 trials.
In the clinical IGT version,even normal decision makers require
three stages (more than 200 trials) to reach standard performance
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FIGURE 6 | Choice pattern comparison using different criteria for bad
decks A and B. According to criteria in the basic assumption and
professional norm, the choice pattern of subjects for bad decks A and B can
be categorized into four types (H_A/L_B: over-selecting deck A and
under-selecting deck B; L_A/H_B: under-selecting deck A and over-selecting
deck B; H_A/H_B: over-selecting deck A and over-selecting deck B; and
L_A/L_B: under-selecting deck A and under-selecting deck B). Obviously,
some significant differences can be observed in the L_A/H_B and L_A/L_B
types when the two different criteria are used.
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1999) as shown in Figures 1 and 5. If
normal decision makers have a problem in reaching standard per-
formance in the standard administration of IGT (100 trials), then
the expected performance of clinical groups must be reconsidered.
Moreover, the control group provides the baseline with which the
results of the clinical group are compared. However, since control
groups have consistently exhibited the PDB phenomenon in too
many IGT-related investigations, neuropsychological assessment
using the clinical IGT version should be reconsidered carefully
(Chiu et al., 2012). Additionally, some studies have mentioned
that the primary factor to be considered in distinguishing between
clinical and control groups in the standard IGT administration
may be GLF, not EV (Crone et al., 2003, 2005; Fernie and Tunney,
2006; Chiu and Lin, 2007; Fernie, 2007; Lin et al., 2007, 2008, 2009;
Chiu et al., 2008; Fum et al., 2008; Stocco et al., 2009).
Actually, the Iowa group has provided some explanation for
PDB in their published manual and mentioned that similar to the
case of neurologically impaired patients, some normal subjects
prefer to choose bad deck B (Bechara, 2007). Therefore, they sug-
gested that verifying the decision ability of neurologically impaired
patients based on their choice pattern for deck B is difficult. This
statement clearly indicates that the preference for deck B is indis-
tinguishable between normal subjects and neurologically impaired
patients. Furthermore, if experimenters use the professional norm
(enclosed in the manual) as reference for interpretation, they will
find that even subjects who strongly prefer bad deck B cannot be
categorized as myopic decision makers because the professional
norm in relation to deck B selection has been broadened.
Classifications based on the basic IGT assumption may become
inconsistent with those based on the professional norm. For
FIGURE 7 | Choice pattern comparison using different criteria for good
decks C and D. According to criteria in the basic assumption and
professional norm, the choice pattern of subjects for good decks C and D
can be categorized into four types (H_C/L_D: over-selecting deck C and
under-selecting deck D; L_C/H_D: under-selecting deck C and over-selecting
deck D; H_C/H_D: over-selecting deck C and over-selecting deck D; and
L_C/L_D: under-selecting deck C and under-selecting deck D). Obviously,
some significant differences can be observed in the L_C/H_D and H_C/H_D
types when the two different criteria are used.
instance, if experimenters use Table A2 (Bechara, 2007, p. 38),
the professional norm for college students (age= 18–39 years and
education= 13–15 years) as reference point, and some subjects
choose cards from bad deck B 38 times (the chance-level is 25),
these subjects will be classified as having normal performance
(>16%). The interpretation for deck B according to the published
manual is inconsistent with the basic IGT assumption but consis-
tent with the present observation in this empirical study. However,
to our knowledge, the deck B statement mentioned above has
been used in turn to explain and further normalize the preference
for deck B, which is incompatible with the basic IGT assumption
(Kully-Martens et al., 2012). Therefore, the Iowa group should
not only revise the interpretation in the manual but also directly
modify the gain-loss structure of the IGT (Bechara, 2007).
RELIABILITY AND PRACTICE EFFECT TEST: COMPARISON BETWEEN
TWO STAGES
Buelow and Suhr (2009) stressed that the IGT lacks consideration
of reliability and practice effect. The Iowa group completed the
(test-retest) reliability examination and suggested that VMPFC
patients still perform worse in IGT, but normal controls could
improve their performance, even 1 day or 6 months later. The
original statement by the Iowa group is as follows:
As a result of repeated testing, E.V.R.’s performance did not
change, one way or the other, when tested one month after the
first test, 24 h later, and for the fourth time, six months later.
This pattern of impaired performance was also seen in other
target subjects. On the contrary, the performance of normal
controls improved over time. (Bechara et al., 1994, p. 13)
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In the present study, normal subjects played the IGT three
times consecutively and the net score [(C+D)−(A+B)] showed
improvement across the three stages. The PDB phenomenon
existed in the first two stages, which is quite inconsistent with
the previous reliability report by the Iowa group. Additionally, the
performance of the subjects for good vs. bad decks was diverse
across the stages (Table 6; Figures 6 and 7), suggesting differences
in the learning speed of subjects on each deck. The choice pat-
tern changed between stages, but the PDB phenomenon existed in
Stage 1, indicating that the reliability of the clinical IGT version
was still yet to be established.
COMPARISON BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL NORM AND BASIC
ASSUMPTION
The present study compared two criteria (professional norm vs.
basic assumption) by filtering the choice patterns of 72 normal
college students. Using the professional norm as a filter appar-
ently underestimated the number of subjects choosing bad deck
B by using a loose criterion (the criterion is largest among all
decks, 38) in the professional manual (Bechara, 2007). We used
the professional norm (B: 38) in filtering the choice patterns of
subjects for bad deck B; only nine subjects over-selected bad deck
B. Meanwhile, with the basic IGT assumption (B: 25), the num-
ber of subjects that over-selected bad deck B was increased to 45.
This part is noticeably inconsistent with the basic IGT assumption
(Figure 6).
Furthermore, in the L_A/L_B group, the number of subjects
filtered by the criteria in the professional norm was lower than
the number of subjects filtered by the criteria in the basic IGT
assumption. Specifically, the criteria in the professional norm for
bad deck B will make the interpretation become “most healthy
subjects could avoid bad decks A and B.” Therefore, the criteria in
the professional norm will become congruent with the basic IGT
assumption. Nevertheless, most experimenters may not notice the
criteria in the professional norm (Bechara, 2007) and that the
basic assumption for deck B is completely different (Bechara et al.,
1994). It is worth noting that few subjects preferred bad deck A
in both criteria. This implies that bad deck A is a relatively more
stable index than bad deck B in assessing normal subjects (Gansler
et al., 2011a).
On the other hand, in terms of good choice patterns, two out of
four categorical groups (L_C/H_D and H_C/H_D) demonstrated
inconsistent classification results when the professional norm and
basic assumption were used (Figure 7). Regardless of the criteria
(professional norm or basic assumption) for filtering choice pat-
terns, both methods showed a large number of subjects preferring
good deck D. This implies that good deck D is a relatively more
stable index than good deck C for establishing the constructional
validity of IGT (Gansler et al., 2011a).
Based on the Iowa group’s serial studies, using the criteria in
the professional norm or in the basic assumption to filter choice
patterns for the same population should yield similar classifica-
tion results. However, the present research illustrated that based
on the criteria in the professional norm, 39 (54.2%) subjects were
identified as foresighted decision makers (L_A/L_B/H_C & H_D).
The identification criterion for good or bad choice patterns is
looser when the professional norm is used than when the basic
IGT assumption is used (Bechara et al., 1994). There were more
foresighted decision makers than myopic decision makers.
Conversely, when the original viewpoint was used to classify
the data, a very different categorization result emerged. A total of
8 (11.1%) subjects were identified as foresighted decision makers
(L_A/L_B/H_C & H_D). Notably, most of the subjects were not
identified as foresighted decision makers, namely, those who are
unable to make a foresighted decision in the long run. This result is
incongruent with the classification result based on the professional
norm and is against the basic IGT assumption.
Not considering two factors, GLF and the practice effect, is risky
for IGT validity. In short, the main purpose behind the design of
the clinical (or computer-based) version by the Iowa group is to
enlarge EV contrast (Table 2) between good and bad decks and
further identify the myopic behavior of VMPFC patients (Bechara
et al., 2000). However, in the present test, even normal subjects
were found to have problems appreciating the high EV contrast
between good and bad decks in the clinical (or computer-based)
IGT version. At the same time, the sample size of subject group
in this study was still limited. Also, the present study was lack
of prescreening with the detailed neuropsychiatric criteria (e.g.,
Mini-Mental State Examination, Beck Depression Inventory, Beck
Anxiety Inventory. . .). If the dataset for the extent of this study
is used to refine the norm, these factors should be also carefully
controlled for.
CONCLUSION
Following several inconsistent studies on the PDB phenomenon,
the present study involved a three-stage experiment to test the
validity and reliability of the clinical IGT version (Bechara, 2007).
The PDB phenomenon was observed in the clinical IGT version
when administered in the standard fashion (with 100 trials). Nev-
ertheless, decision makers may adopt an immediate perspective
under uncertainty (Stage 1) but make long-term deliberations
under relative certainty (Stage 3). Consequently, this study suggests
that the present format of the IGT is not only invalid for deter-
mining the choice patterns of normal decision makers, but also
invalid for the clinical assessment of neuropsychological patients.
GLF should be reconsidered in the future revision of the clinical
IGT version.
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